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Research
omission (usually) or commission.2 Learn-
ing from both adverse events and near-
misses is essential for improving the quality
of care,3,4 yet under-reporting remains a
significant problem,5,6 occurring at a rate of








Objectives:  (i) To examine attitudes of medical and nursing staff towards reporting 
incidents (adverse events and near-misses), and (ii) to identify measures to facilitate 
incident reporting.
Design:  Qualitative study. In March 2002, semistructured questions were administered 
to five focus groups — one each for consultants, registrars, resident medical officers, 
r nurses, and junior nurses.
icipants and setting:  14 medical and 19 nursing staff recruited using purposive 
ling from three metropolitan public hospitals in Adelaide, South Australia.
 outcome measures:  Attitudes and barriers to incident reporting; differences 
porting behaviour between disciplines; how to facilitate incident reporting.
lts:  Cultural differences between doctors and nurses, identified using Triandis’ 
theory of social behaviour, were found to underpin attitudes to incident reporting. 
Nurses reported more habitually than doctors due to a culture which provided 
directives, protocols and the notion of security, whereas the medical culture was less 
transparent, favoured dealing with incidents “in-house” and was less reliant on 
directives. Common barriers to reporting incidents included time constraints, 
unsatisfactory processes, deficiencies in knowledge, cultural norms, inadequate 
feedback, beliefs about risk, and a perceived lack of value in the process.
Conclusions: 
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 Strategies to improve incident reporting must address cultural issues.rro
ex
HoE r-free performance is a standardpected from health professionals.wever, health systems and person-
nel are not infallible; errors are made, with
high human and economic costs.1 Adverse
events are visible manifestations of errors,
and most represent unintended errors of
between medical and nursing professional
groups,5 with nurses reporting significantly
more often than doctors. Outside the disci-
pline of anaesthesiology, nurses initiated
88% and medical staff only 2% of reports
submitted through the Australian Incident
Monitoring System (AIMS) between 1998
and 2002.8 These differences possibly relate
to previously identified hierarchical and cul-
tural variations.9,10
In view of the sensitive nature of reporting
of medical errors, as well as the complexities
of cultures in healthcare organisations, and
to provide insight into motivating factors for
reporting, we considered a qualitative study
using focus groups to be the most effective
means of data collection.11 To provide social
and cultural homogeneity within groups,
and enable participants to explore issues
relevant to them in a non-threatening envi-
ronment among peers,12,13 each focus group
comprised participants from the same disci-
pline and level of seniority.
The research aims were (i) to examine
attitudes of medical and nursing staff
towards reporting incidents (adverse events
and near-misses), and (ii) to identify meas-
ures to facilitate incident reporting.
METHODS
Recruitment
Recruitment was through purposive sam-
pling from five units across three tertiary
metropolitan public hospitals in Adelaide,
South Australia. After ethical approval was
granted from each organisation, participants
were sought from two medical wards, one
surgical ward, one intensive care unit and
one emergency department from all the
hospitals together. This provided a repre-
sentative sample of a range of specialties
within the hospitals. Participation was vol-
untary, and, to encourage attendance, staff
coverage was arranged, transport costs were
met, and a modest honorarium provided.
Box 1 shows the demographic profile of the
participants.
Focus groups
Five focus groups, each conducted over a 2-
hour period, were held over 2 days from 21
to 22 March 2002 at an independent health
research organisation. Each focus group was
conducted by the same facilitator, who has
extensive experience in health-related quali-
tative research. All focus groups were led
using a topic guide (Box 2), and were semi-
structured with open-ended questions
designed to encourage group discourse. The
group was audiotaped and viewed by
researchers from an adjacent viewing room.
Data analysis
Reliability was improved by an iterative
approach to data categorisation.14 Tran-
scripts were generated from the audiotapes
and independently coded by two research-
ers. Coding was compared and, when con-
sensus could not be reached, a third person
adjudicated.14,15 The data were entered
under thematic categories based on Triandis’
behavioural modelling theory16,17 using
NUD*IST software.18
Triandis’ theory is a comprehensive theory
of social behaviour for use as a “framework
for data collection”16 and has particular rel-MJA • Volume 181 Number 1 • 5 July 2004
RESEARCHevance for health research.19 Triandis
intended that the theory be used as a quick
and imprecise way of organising a lot of
information so that precise theoretical state-
ments could be formulated.16 The probabil-
ity of behaving in a particular way is
governed by Triandis’ equation:
Probability of act = [habit + intention*] 
×[motivation × facilitating conditions]
* Intention = social factors (subjective 
culture) + affect + value of perceived 
consequences (positive and negative).
Due to the exploratory nature of this
research, the equation was used for thematic
categorisation rather than prediction of
behaviour.
RESULTS
Results are discussed in the context of each
component of Triandis’ theory.16,17
Habit
In given situations, certain behaviours occur
automatically and without self-instruction.
These are called habits and, except for new
situations (which require deliberate and
controlled effort), are the most important
predictors of behaviour.17
There were discernible differences
between doctors and nurses. Doctors did
not report through habit. A registrar com-
mented: “It just doesn’t occur to me that an
incident report should be made . . .” and a
Registered Medical Officer (RMO) said: “We
do [complete incident reports] but the nurses
are the ones who initiate it. It’s not the doctors
who make that decision.” More serious events
were not thought of in a reporting context,
and were often not regarded as incidents,
but as known complications.
Reporting by nurses is more habitual.
“Our organisation tells us that we need to fill
out these forms, therefore we do. We have
directives; whether we do them well or not . . .
that’s another question”, explained a senior
nurse. Habitual reporting was dependent on
the type of incidents (eg, patient falls and
medication errors were routinely reported)
and location (eg, a skin tear occurring on the
ward was more likely to be reported than if
it occurred in theatre).
Intention
Intention is a self-instruction to perform an
act and comprises social factors, affect and
perceived consequences.17
Social factors
Beliefs, attitudes, ideals, roles, norms and
values of peers impact on a person’s decision
to perform an act.17
General discussions revealed a preference
for doctors of all seniority to keep adverse
events “in-house”. They believed in loyalty
to colleagues, and that “whistleblowing” was
both unethical and unsupportive. A consult-
ant postulated that nurses were better at
reporting incidents because of their relative
powerlessness, it being their only recourse
to improve a situation, while another stated:
“This [reporting] fits the nursing mould of
thinking, which is very rigid and, you know,
black and white . . . I see a problem, I can deal
with this by communicating with the people
concerned without going to paperwork. Nurses
don’t think like that. Nurses think this must be
reported, put on paper and some action must
occur that’s official . . .”.
Nurses’ concerns related more to personal
protection and possible punitive repercus-
sions than issues of loyalty. As stated by a
junior nurse: “You do [complete an incident
report] to cover yourself”. Another spoke of
system difficulties when reporting a col-
league: “ . . . they’re [incident forms] put up all
over the place for people to just look through . . .
if you have a box to put them into that’ll be
great, because people wouldn’t mind filling it in.
You sign it and people look at you and think,
‘What’s she got against me?’.” Although con-
cern was expressed over patient wellbeing
and safety, this was not reflected as strongly
as the preceding issues.
Affect
Affect refers to “the emotions a person feels
at the thought of the behaviour”.16
With regard to incident reporting, doctors
experienced insecurity, distrust and anxiety
over the use of incident data and the poten-
tial medicolegal implications of reporting
incidents. “Unless you have protected, confi-
dential information, you don’t get the facts,”
explained a consultant. Senior doctors felt
1 Demographic profile of focus-group participants
Professional 
group Focus group Position Female Male
Age range 
(years)
Nurses 1 Senior nurse* 6 5 24–47
2 Junior nurse† 7 1 22–46
Doctors 3 Consultant 0 4 41–63
4 Registrar 1 3 29–37
5 Resident medical officer 4 2 24–33
* Nurses undertaking advanced clinical practice in senior management positions within the ward/unit.
† Registered nurses or enrolled nurses undertaking clinical practice under the supervision of a senior nurse.
2 Topic guide for the focus groups
• What comes to mind when you hear the word “incident reporting”?
• What is the current reporting process in your organisation?
• Can you think of any positive things that have occurred as a result of completing an incident 
report? Can you think of any negative things?
• How would you rate the current reporting system?
• If you were in charge of the incident reporting system, what changes, if any, would you make?
• How many times a year, on average, do people in your position fill out incident reports?
• Why do people decide to complete an incident report?
• How do you think people feel when they complete an incident report?
• Based on your experience, how many times a year should people in your position fill out an 
incident report?
• What makes people in your position decide not to complete a report?
• Does the seriousness of the situation have any bearing on whether an incident report is made, 
or not?
• On the sheet, I have listed some of the obstacles to reporting.* Do you have any comments? 
Which of these do you regard as the really big issues? Are there any other obstacles?
• Would having a form with the option of not identifying the reporter make a difference?
• Is there anything else we should have discussed that we haven’t touched on yet?
* List available from the authors on request.MJA • Volume 181 Number 1 • 5 July 2004 37
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mistakes, while an RMO described feeling
“loss of face among peers, and, yeah, sometimes
embarrassment”.
Nurses expressed a similar range of emo-
tions, including distrust and anxiety. As
stated by one senior nurse: “I find it a little
intimidating. It’s very scary if something hap-
pens. I don’t feel happy, because I have to fill a
form out and I think I feel a little frightened that
I’d get blamed for it.” They experienced frus-
tration with the present system, which pro-
vided little feedback or incentive to report.
Nurses were embarrassed at making mis-
takes, but accepted the need for a reporting
system. Others were relieved at having dealt
with an incident. Junior nurses generally
perceived the culture as encouraging blame
and being punitive, and they lacked trust in
the organisation’s ability to provide support,
while some senior nurses believed the
organisation itself promoted secrecy as a
defence against litigation.
Perceived consequences
Perceived consequences may be positive or
negative, and are often dependent on previ-
ous experiences.17
Negative consequences: Doctors were suspi-
cious and worried about a process they
perceived as providing no guaranteed legal
protection. They were wary of a reporting
system which could be used to inform
against doctors, and where doctors had no
right of rebuttal; for example, a registrar
described an incident where “a medical regis-
trar couldn’t attend a code black [personal
threat] and the nurse went ballistic and filled
out the incident report as a way of emphasising
how irritated she was, and I thought that it was
a very inappropriate use.”
Junior and senior nurses’ concerns were
predominantly over issues of blame and
punishment (eg, black marks on work
records, job insecurity and threats to future
employment). This was most evident among
junior staff, some of whom feared bullying
and harassment.
Positive consequences: All doctors envisaged
benefits in a system providing prompt, rele-
vant feedback from local and global infor-
mation. The knowledge gained was
expected to contribute to evidence-based
medicine and positively influence their
work practice and environment. In agree-
ment with nurses, they believed incident
reporting could be an effective means of
making governing bodies aware of problems
in the health system.
Nurses believed incident reporting could
provide valuable information, increase
awareness and contribute to positive change
through improved work conditions and
nursing care (eg, additional staff, workplace
support and debriefing). Documentation of
procedures also provided justification for
restraining aggressive patients, and defence
against patient complaints.
Motivation
Motivation refers to the ability to stimulate
the interest of a person in an activity, and is
closely linked to perceptions of positive
consequences.17
Both medical and nursing participants
made comments that a more effective and
efficient incident reporting system without
threat or blame, providing prompt, relevant
feedback and driving improvements in
health administration, would possibly moti-
vate medical staff to report.
Senior medical staff commented on the
lack of motivation to participate in a report-
ing process regarded as a waste of time and
of little value, and rather jokingly suggested
that monetary payment for reports gener-
ated might provide greater incentive for
doing so.
Nurses were frustrated and annoyed by
doctors’ lack of motivation to report inci-
dents. A junior nurse explained: “I don’t
see why we have to chase them [doctors] up;
they’re a separate entity. They’re lacking with
[sic] discipline, and they’re lazy . . . gener-
ally it’s the Medical Officers that let the side
down . . .”.
Facilitating conditions
These are objective environmental factors
that “several observers can agree make an
act easy to do”.17
Doctors and nurses suggested the report-
ing process be simplified and made less
time-consuming (< 2 minutes). Both wanted
clearer definition of what constituted an
adverse event or a near-miss, and to see
some value in the process.
Registrars suggested that the reporting
process be made more relevant to doctors
and less threatening by renaming the form.
Awareness and knowledge of the process
needed to be increased, and protection from
liability of the person and information guar-
anteed.
Nurses wanted a more efficient, egalitar-
ian system that did not require additional
input from doctors. They advocated educa-
tion at orientation for both nurses and
doctors. While most nurses supported
3 Summary of suggested strategies to facilitate incident reporting, based on 
barriers identified by focus-group participants
Barriers to incident reporting Suggested strategies
Lack of knowledge about the 
process and what constitutes 
an incident
• Education at orientation
• Ongoing education and use of case studies to highlight 
reportable events at departmental forums
• Ability to access a reference manual about what to report
“Nursing Form” by association • Rename/redesign the form to make it more relevant to 
medical staff
Time constraints and complexity 
of reporting form
• Simplify the reporting process — one page being the 
optimal length
• Option of quicker reporting processes (eg, telephone 
reporting, online submission)
Lack of feedback when report 
generated
• Risk-assessment tool to prioritise action for follow-up. 
Type and timing of feedback given dependent on 
severity of incident or degree of risk to the organisation. 
Staff informed of follow-up processes
Lack of legal privilege afforded 
to the reporting process
• Education to explain current legal privilege afforded 
through Australian federal legislation
• Confidentiality guaranteed
• Increased confidentiality and security of the reporting 
process to prevent access to information by 
unauthorised personnel
Culture of blame • Option to report anonymously to an independent body, 
without fear of being identified and with the option to 
omit identifiers of either self and/or organisation
• Education
No value • Individual/group feedback of action taken38 MJA • Volume 181 Number 1 • 5 July 2004
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means of addressing the issues and not the
person, senior nurses voiced concern that
this would limit their ability to adequately
follow up incidents.
DISCUSSION
Our qualitative study has improved under-
standing of the attitudes of medical and
nursing health professionals towards report-
ing incidents, and identified process disin-
centives to reporting within a context of
cultural variation (Box 3). Understanding
the culture of an organisation is critical to
making sense of the behaviour observed in
it,20 and values, beliefs and assumptions
form the core of organisational culture.21
The focus-group commentary suggested a
division of cultures, in which hierarchies
may impede communication, particularly
across professional groups. This is likely to
be compounded by traditional concepts of
medical and nursing roles.
The most obvious differences in reporting
behaviour related to perceived conse-
quences of reporting — doctors were con-
cerned mostly with outside forces (eg,
coroner’s inquests, litigation), whereas
nurses tended to be more defensive and to
feel more threatened by the organisation’s
response to error. Other behavioural differ-
ences could be attributed to nurses having
more directives to follow protocols, the
influence of social modelling, and the
notion of having to “cover themselves”. In
contrast, the medical culture promoted pri-
vacy, was less transparent, used fewer direc-
tives and demonstrated virtually non-
existent social modelling in relation to
reporting incidents. This supports other
research showing that protocols govern
nursing practice far more than that of doc-
tors, whose culture emphasises professional
autonomy, collegiality, self-regulation and
organisationally opaque systems of account-
ability.11
A strength of our research is that it
allowed candid contributions by partici-
pants in single specialty groups. A search of
the medical literature showed no previous
reports of similar qualitative studies relating
to incident reporting in Australia. However,
our study has a number of limitations.
Although purposive sampling allowed
involvement of users and non-users of inci-
dent reporting, the voluntary nature of par-
ticipation provided potential for more
motivated and opinionated people to attend
than if random sampling had been used.
Additionally, despite using a facilitator to
encourage equal contributions and a voice
for all participants, focus-group dynamics
may favour the group norm and silence
individual voices of dissent.11 Finally, our
study was limited to public hospitals, and
our findings, although consistent across
three hospitals, can not be generalised to
other healthcare settings. Further research is
needed to determine whether the views
expressed are representative of those of
other healthcare sectors.
Our study has identified, in an Australian
context, that innovations to improve patient
safety, such as incident reporting, require
cultural change. A climate that does not
foster disclosure and investigation of errors
has been found to be pervasive in healthcare
systems both locally22 and overseas,23 and is
clearly detrimental to patients’ best interests.
Cultural change is possible, even if it is a
slow process. Further research is required to
test whether facilitating conditions for inci-
dent reporting alters reporting behaviour.
However, this in itself is unlikely to lead to
any change without the support and
involvement of top-level management in the
promotion of a culture of safety.
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